

From a “new paradigm” to “memorial sprawl”:
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Memorial

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Whenever a society creates a memorial, it communicates across time: it speaks to the future about the past. It offers lessons and admonitions about examples to emulate and to avoid. In United States presidential monuments, America speaks not just about a particular historical personage but also about itself. Although the US Constitution makes the executive a co-equal branch of government, the president is the pre-eminent representative of the nation. Accordingly, when Americans debate the design of presidential memorials, they usually demand monuments possessing qualities commensurate with the esteem that they believe the nation deserves in the eyes of its citizens and of the world. Of all genres of public art, presidential memorials charge their creators with the responsibility to evoke dignity and promote respect.

A judgment about the design of a presidential memorial always involves a dual evaluation. It requires an assessment of the record and reputation of the remembered president; it also demands an evaluation of the proposed form of the monument: how adequate is it to the general demands of presidential commemoration and to the particular remembered figure? These problems have haunted the debates about the design for the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in the nation's capital, for which ground breaking took place in November 2017 after years of wrangling about the qualities of the design.

The designer of a memorial to Eisenhower faced particular challenges. Unlike Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, whose legacies define the poles of national policy debates decades after they left office, Dwight D. Eisenhower does not stand for a philosophy of government that remains salient to contemporary political parties, especially not to the contemporary Republican Party. Advocates of an Eisenhower memorial said that he had saved the world for freedom and presided over eight years of peace and prosperity; he combined personal qualities of humility, determination, and toughness; he chose the middle way between extremes. In our time of partisan conflict and tribal polarization, however, Eisenhower's vaunted virtues seemed to belong to an imperfectly remembered realm of bipartisanship far from the realities of politics today. No one, anyway, came up with a convincing idea of how to represent his qualities and achievements in a memorial.

That task fell to Frank Gehry, the superstar architect of his day.¹ Gehry produced exactly the kind of path-breaking design that was consistent with his record and reputation as an innovator. Traditionalist commentators on architecture and members of the Eisenhower family objected to its principal features, and legislators intervened to force changes. When Republicans won a majority of seats in the House of Representatives in 2010, the party members who assumed the chairs of crucial House committees threatened to de-fund the memorial in order to put pressure on the Eisenhower Memorial Commission (EMC) and the designer. Politicians had little idea of what to put in its place beyond advocating a portrait statue; nevertheless, despite their lack of expertise in art and architecture, they began to tinker with the design. In the end, the statutory review process became unhinged and the commissions with authority over memorials in the nation's capital were rendered spectators in the power play that determined the final outcome. By then, Gehry had altered the design by adding realistic statuary in order to appease the critics; the perceived need for racial inclusiveness in the statues then collided with the historical realities underlying the depicted scenes that current politics demand.

The arguments about the design were particularly fraught because of the lack of consensus about what kind of memorial is

appropriate today, an uncertainty that began with shifts in conceptions of "the monumental" that have their roots in the nineteenth century, reached a high pitch in the mid-twentieth century and have never been resolved. In the last century, the design features of modern architecture and art came into conflict with concepts of the monumental to the extent that monumentality and modernism were seen to be contradictory.

In Washington's landscape of commemoration, both grandeur and monumentality have often seemed to equate with neoclassicism or its stripped-down variants. Hard to pin down, the traditional qualities of monuments—solidity, grandeur, classicism, and magnificence—seemed out of step with modernity's élan. To many commentators, they seemed incompatible. Lewis Mumford wrote, "The notion of a modern monument is veritably a contradiction in terms . . . If it is a monument it is not modern, and if it is modern, it cannot be a monument."² (One can only guess at how Mumford would have assessed the compatibility of monumentalism and post-modernity.) If one tried to reconcile architectural innovation and monumentalism, questions abounded: should monumental grandeur be achieved through mass and proportion alone, without ornament?³ How might new materials be incorporated? Glass, steel, chrome, aluminum, and concrete created impressive, at times magnificent modern residential and commercial buildings, but was commemorative architecture and design an intrinsically tradition-bound form that would reject such innovations?

In 1982, commemorative Washington seemed to provide an answer in the form of the minimalist, abstract design of Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and in the public's overwhelming acceptance of that unprecedented yet magnificent monument. That design may prove to be the exception, rather than an indication of a trend line. Its innovative features responded to the problem of creating a memorial in a nation fissured by the Vietnam War: a unique response to a crisis of representation that could not be answered in the traditional language of memorial design. Moreover, Maya Lin's design was beset by political and aesthetic criticisms, and compromised by the addition of statuary and a flag.⁴ Gehry's design for the Eisenhower memorial would be the most formally non-traditional proposal for a Washington memorial

since Lin's black granite wall. If one needed a fresh cautionary tale about the hostility that can greet such designs, the story of the Eisenhower Memorial provides it.

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 established the EMC to "consider and formulate plans for . . . a permanent memorial to Dwight D. Eisenhower, including its nature, design, construction, and location," and made an initial appropriation of \$300,000 to cover its costs.⁵ The statute provided that the commission membership would consist of four people appointed by the president, four by the president pro tempore of the Senate, and four by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, all groups being bipartisan in composition. One of the presidential appointees was David Eisenhower, the late president's grandson.⁶ The EMC's membership seemed to hedge against objections, since the political establishment and Eisenhower family were represented in its number.

In 2002, Congress affirmed the memorial's authorization and appropriated \$2.6 million to assist with construction.⁷ After several years of study, a piece of federal land in Washington, DC was selected from among twenty-six possibilities.⁸ The site is a seven-and-a-half acre urban plaza, of which the memorial precinct would occupy about four acres. The piece of ground is wedged between Independence Avenue to the north, the Lyndon B. Johnson Building (which houses the Department of Education) to the south, and to the east and west 4th and 6th Streets, SW. This rectangle is bisected by the diagonal of Maryland Avenue. On the other side of Independence Avenue is the National Air and Space Museum. The location has its complications. The paved area in front of the Lyndon B. Johnson Building is rather neglected; the memorial must accommodate a sunken courtyard which serves as a light well for and means of egress from the building's basement level. The area is surrounded by multi-storey mid-rise office buildings, and the predominant aesthetic is of mid-twentieth-century modern architecture. A member of Congress who played an influential role in design development called the surrounding architecture "Stalinistic."⁹

In 2006, the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) recommended design principles that included the requirement that the memorial harmonize with its site, respect the surrounding

buildings and trees, and reflect Pierre Charles L'Enfant's plan for Washington, DC, which had included the creation of broad diagonal avenues giving onto important landmarks.¹⁰ In line with various plans for Washington's commemorative core approved by the NCPC and its partner commissions, the most important axis at the designated location produced reciprocal views to and from the US Capitol along Maryland Avenue.¹¹

The EMC held a design competition, which emphasized the credentials and portfolio of the entrants and therefore tended to draw in established architects and designers. The EMC positively invited a non-traditional design. The competition brief said that the commission wanted a "new vision" and a "new paradigm": "The National Eisenhower Memorial at Eisenhower Square will be the first national presidential memorial of the new century. No language currently exists for a twenty-first-century memorial. Eisenhower Square is an opportunity to explore new avenues in memorialization. The competitive designer and design team selection process will embrace the widest possible range of innovative concepts and ideas. It is intended that the physical memorial will have a very significant electronic component. Thus there can be a strong visual statement about Eisenhower and also allow for a depth of information as wanted. The result will be a new vision of memorialization: a new paradigm for memorials."¹² The competition attracted some forty-four entrants, from which an evaluation board, including David Eisenhower, selected four as semi-finalists.¹³ A jury of design professionals and David Eisenhower then gathered to make the final selection.¹⁴ They granted the commission to Gehry. The selection of an architect known for using titanium to create sinuous, asymmetrical, sometimes crumpled shapes in landmark buildings, with a prior history of adapting vernacular materials to unexpected purposes, seemed to bear out that the EMC wanted to create a memorial with a "wow" factor—one that would help reinvent the language of memorialization and make the Eisenhower memorial stand out.¹⁵

Gehry's cause was championed by Rocco Siciliano, a former aide to Eisenhower who chaired the memorial commission.¹⁶ Once the opposition to Gehry's design coalesced, opponents questioned the integrity of the selection process. They said that

Siciliano had a strong and enduring connection with Gehry and had spoken to the architect about designing the Eisenhower Memorial years before the competition took place.¹⁷ They also questioned whether the General Service Administration's (GSA) Design Excellence Program, usually used for the commissioning of government buildings, was the appropriate vehicle for organizing a competition to select a memorial design.¹⁸ Moreover, they said the competition had not observed the steps usually required by the GSA procedure.¹⁹

In May 2010, Gehry presented three possible designs to the EMC and then to the Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), one of the statutory agencies responsible for approving memorial designs in Washington. The design team preferred the third, featuring massive, limestone-clad columns, eighty feet tall and twelve feet in diameter (later reduced to ten feet). The columns supported large, elevated woven stainless steel "tapestries" representing scenes from Eisenhower's life: perhaps Eisenhower fixing a fence at his home, images from World War II, or Eisenhower in the White House surrounded by his cabinet.²⁰ There would also be inscriptions from Eisenhower's famous speeches.²¹ In the midst of the urban park the memorial created would be trees typical of the landscape of Abilene, Kansas, Eisenhower's hometown. At this stage there were no sculptures or reliefs. Gehry acknowledged that there was a "strong historical tradition" of commemoration with bronze sculptures but he said that modern-day sculptures were "typically not satisfactory."²² The CFA agreed that the tapestries made sculpture superfluous.²³ Along with these material and visual elements, there would be a so-called E-memorial: some sort of representation of historical and policy research on the life and achievements of the former president. It would involve a website and a downloadable app for the mobile phones of visitors.²⁴

In January 2011, the design team of Gehry Partners and the landscape architecture firm AECOM presented the same three alternatives to the CFA, again preferring the third. By this time it had evolved. The Gehry firm had sent the choreographer, theatre designer, and actor Robert Wilson on a mission to Abilene, Kansas, to help identify images for the tapestries. Wilson was inspired by the rural landscape, and he suggested a photograph

of Eisenhower's boyhood home and the surrounding countryside for the main tapestry because it would convey Eisenhower's Midwestern background.²⁵ Images of trees on the woven metal would suggest black-and-white photographs, to evoke "the landscape in Eisenhower's time."²⁶ They would also provide a backdrop for the living trees of similar species in the memorial precinct. Gehry was enthusiastic. Describing Eisenhower as "a man from the Midwest, from Middle America," Gehry said that he wanted to get away from the Greek temple as a form of commemoration and instead present imagery of the Midwest to Washington, DC, "because a lot of our leaders come from that place and it has not been portrayed in DC."²⁷ The combination of elements would create a set of symbolic relationships with a narrative component: while the tapestries and plantings would evoke the landscape of the rural Midwest, stone lintels would carry the inscriptions from Eisenhower's speeches, and stone relief sculptures would present scenes of Eisenhower in the White House and Eisenhower as Allied supreme commander. Together, these elements would represent Eisenhower's personal journey from his origins in Abilene, his achievements in rising to a supreme role in the armed forces, and his role as president and, later, world citizen.²⁸

Wilson returned from Kansas with another inspiration. The presidential museum in Abilene sells a pamphlet titled "Dreams of a Barefoot Boy."²⁹ A statue of Eisenhower as a youth exists in downtown Abilene, in "Little Ike Park." Both the pamphlet and the statue recall the homecoming speech Eisenhower had given in June 1945, when he said how proud he was to come from Abilene. The speech begins, "Because no man is really a man who has lost out of himself all of the boy, I want to speak first of the dreams of a barefoot boy."³⁰ For Wilson, the speech captured the future president's rootedness in the nation's heartland. At a design meeting, he picked up one of the miniature figures populating the architectural model, painted it white, and placed it at the center to represent Eisenhower as a boy. Gehry said, "When Wilson picked up the little figure and put him there, it was a moment of epiphany, somehow."³¹

The result was a new focal point: a small statue of Eisenhower would be placed on a low wall bridging the armed forces

and White House scenes.³² Its presence emphasized the story of Eisenhower the person. This idea had initially come through the symbolism of the landscape, representing the place where Eisenhower was raised.³³ This allusion became vivid with the addition of the young Eisenhower statue. The youth would be caught looking out at what he would become, a general and a statesman, in the relief sculptures.

The proposed design was remarkably successful in adapting to a problematic urban site. The columns and tapestries marked out the perimeter of an urban park in the midst of the built-up area. They created a sense of grandeur from the outside and intimacy inside.³⁴ Openings among the tapestries, columns, and trees created a view towards the Capitol Building. Unlike other major memorials in Washington, DC, this one would not form a terminal point in the original plan by L'Enfant, or its early-twentieth-century adaptation by the Senate Park Commission. Instead, it occupied an intermediate point on the axis between the Capitol and the Jefferson Memorial. The landscape architect Joe Brown, a member of AECOM, said that this was consistent with L'Enfant's plan of having memorials integrated into the fabric of the city.³⁵ The design transformed the role of columns, suggestive of a temple's colonnade, in a presidential monument. Since they marked the exterior boundary of the tree-filled precinct, Brown said that instead of creating a temple in a garden, the design created a garden in a temple.³⁶ A portrait statue at the center of the site would underwhelm; yet a Greek temple would have been overshadowed by its neighbors, the Lyndon B. Johnson Building and the other nearby office buildings, or would have appeared incompatible with them. Gehry's design appeared to have found an ingenious solution to the difficulties of the site.³⁷

Some critics and design professionals applauded. Philip Kennicott, the chief art and architecture critic for the *Washington Post*, wrote that Gehry was reinvigorating the language of memorial design. Kennicott said, "Gehry's design, which uses large-scale metal tapestries to memorialize the 34th president, is the first serious innovation in the history of memorial design since the bold and abstract geometries of Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial."³⁸ The architect David Childs, who had chaired both the CFA and

the NCPC as well as the prominent architecture firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, said that, building on tradition, the design "expresses it within contemporary interpretation." To Childs, it was a humble design, rather than a showy "statement," and he approved of its reliance on architectural and landscape elements rather than statuary groups.³⁹

The design team submitted the proposed plan to the statutory review commissions at meetings in 2011, and revised it as a result of their suggestions. The tapestries at the front, which had run parallel to the ones at the rear, were shifted around 90 degrees to create something more like an outdoor "room" rather than a proscenium or a series of layers.⁴⁰ The grouping of trees was also configured to draw attention to the vista of the Capitol Building. The precise location and height of the trees were the subject of frequent discussion and tweaking to produce the effect of a park with a perimeter and to produce the desired viewshed. In July 2011 the EMC approved the design and in September 2011, the CFA unanimously gave it conceptual approval.⁴¹

Gehry had been so focused on the development of the memorial design that he appears to have been caught off guard by the emergence of criticism. In October 2011, Gehry and Wilson spoke at a public conversation at the National Archives. Justin Shubow of the National Civic Art Society, a group that favors traditionalist architecture and monuments, denounced the proposal, saying that it was redolent of chaos and nihilism. He said the memorial rejected the past and tradition, and everything that Eisenhower had stood for.⁴² And notably, three of Eisenhower's granddaughters expressed their concerns about the "concept for the memorial," as well as its scope and scale, the first time they had spoken out publicly about the design.⁴³

Some Eisenhower family members had been uncomfortable with Gehry's proposal from early on. Soon after the EMC formed, Susan Eisenhower, one of the granddaughters, had reportedly proposed to Siciliano a "living memorial," something like the Woodrow Wilson Center, but she was rebuffed.⁴⁴ The family members had a variety of views when they learned of the notion of representing the Kansas landscape through the tapestries, with the young Eisenhower statue in their midst. As the spring of 2011

gave way to summer, the family began to close ranks against the Gehry plan.⁴⁵ Initially they expressed their opposition behind the scenes. David Eisenhower had supported another architect during the selection process but remained a member of the commission afterward.⁴⁶ His membership in the EMC compromised the family's ability to campaign against the memorial, but also gave them some hope of being able to influence the design development process from within.

Gehry met the Eisenhower granddaughters in New York at the beginning of December 2011. (David Eisenhower did not attend.) Soon after, Anne Eisenhower told Gehry that the family objected to elements of the proposal. David Eisenhower resigned from the commission a week later.⁴⁷ This step marked a break between the family and the EMC and freed them to speak out publicly. The president's son, John S.D. Eisenhower, said that the memorial should be "as simple as possible," implicitly distancing himself from a design whose scale and complexity clearly did not fit that description.⁴⁸ He advocated an "Eisenhower Square that is a green open space with a simple statue in the middle," a proposal that others later echoed.⁴⁹ Precedents for such a statue—which depict Eisenhower as an adult, usually in military uniform—exist in a number of locations, including at the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene and in Grosvenor Square, London. Of course, a simple statue in a park was exactly the sort of traditional memorial concept that the EMC's competition brief had set out to revolutionize.

Susan Eisenhower expressed frustration that the EMC appeared to be forging ahead with the memorial without providing an opportunity to discuss any modifications. This complaint disregarded the existence of a statutory review process where family members, civic groups, and citizens could express their opinions. What Susan Eisenhower seemed to be suggesting, though, was not that the family members be allowed to comment, as anyone else could, but that they had a special right to be heard. Their role had been recognized by the inclusion of one Eisenhower grandchild in the EMC, but he had relinquished his seat. Now they girded themselves to exert pressure from outside.

Susan Eisenhower said that "we do not 'hate' the design, nor do we pass artistic judgment on any of the artists who have been

engaged in this process. Appropriateness, however, is absolutely key to the memorialization of Dwight Eisenhower."⁵⁰ As family members expressed themselves in various hearings, public fora, and Susan Eisenhower's website, they made clear that they regarded Gehry's design as inappropriate: the memorial was too grandiose in scale; the columns were gargantuan; they disliked the tapestries; and they thought the barefoot boy concept was demeaning. In March 2012, Susan Eisenhower said that the family and the EMC had reached an impasse: as she explained, the "Horatio Alger" narrative implicit in the statue of Eisenhower as a youth was inconsistent with his achievements as president and as liberator of Europe. The president was a great (albeit a modest) man, not a dreamy youth. Controversy about the design, she said, was going to make fundraising impossible, and the memorial would cost considerably more than the amount the design team estimated. It was time to go back to the drawing board.⁵¹

Raising the issue of fundraising demonstrated the family's willingness to play hardball. The reality to which Susan Eisenhower was drawing attention was that in the face of objections by the family, the EMC was going to find it difficult to raise private funds to pay the costs of the memorial. This issue was critical because Congress had determined that the memorial's costs should be met by a mixture of public and private funding, but the proportions remained undefined.⁵² Difficulties in private fundraising would throw the whole responsibility for paying the costs onto Congress. This situation gave legislators reason for concern about the demands on the public purse, but it also gave them leverage. If the opponents of the design could discourage legislators from appropriating funds, they would obtain a stranglehold over the project. In the midterm elections of 2010, political circumstances changed when the Republican Party won a majority in the House of Representatives. One by one, the newly appointed Republican chairmen of House committees with decision-making authority or oversight responsibility over monuments, government operations, and appropriations threw in their lot with the Eisenhower family. Together, the legislators and the family demonstrated that they would prefer to sink the whole project rather than accept a design they disliked.

Susan Eisenhower's positive reference in March 2012 to the design selection process for the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial left no room for doubt about the family's resolve. She saw it not as an obstacle course to be avoided but as an affirmative precedent discouraging haste. As she wrote, "The time is now to get this memorial right. We should not be afraid of delays. The FDR Memorial took three different design competitions before reaching a final plan."⁵³ This was not strictly true: while the FDR Memorial went through three principal designs, only the first of them was selected as the result of an open competition. Regardless of the historical details, the FDR Memorial might be remembered quite differently, as an unpleasant reminder to the EMC of what could go wrong with a presidential memorial: after Roosevelt family members, some critics, and the CFA rejected the original design by William F. Pedersen and Bradford S. Tilney, a later design by Marcel Breuer also foundered. It took decades before the memorial designed by Lawrence Halprin was dedicated. Advocates of other controversial memorial projects had learned to think of the long delays in the FDR memorial's creation as a warning of how a project could derail, not as an example to emulate.⁵⁴ Bruce Cole, an adviser to the National Civic Art Society, a critic of Gehry's design and a late appointee to the EMC, admitted that the FDR memorial was a "bad precedent."⁵⁵

In response to the objections, Gehry considered various modifications: more bas reliefs, a list of Eisenhower's accomplishments, more speeches. He said that, as he researched Eisenhower's life and career, he grew increasingly impressed by Ike's personal characteristics and achievements. When an EMC commissioner asked him how the design embodied these virtues, a floundering Gehry responded that "such qualities and achievements would be represented as emanations from the central idea of Ike's greatness."⁵⁶ In the end, Gehry reverted to the most traditional means of celebrating an individual's greatness: he decided to transform the two bas reliefs into three-dimensional bronze statuary groups, one representing Eisenhower as president, flanked by civilian and military advisers in the Oval Office; the other representing Eisenhower as supreme allied commander in World War II, addressing airborne troops on D-Day.⁵⁷ Carl W. Reddel, the executive director of the EMC, described them as "heroic-sized."⁵⁸

This change followed a well-trodden path in commemorative Washington. In the nineteenth century, monuments were almost always statues.⁵⁹ In one instance after another from the mid-twentieth century to the present, the addition of realistic statuary has been a compromise memorial designers have been pressured to make in trying to get an abstract or non-traditional design built.⁶⁰ The acceptance of the need for realistic statuary, which Gehry had once regarded as superfluous, marked a step back towards tradition. Gehry also tried to appease the Eisenhower family by suggesting that the figure of Ike as a young barefoot boy might be replaced by a depiction of Eisenhower in young adulthood, perhaps as a West Point cadet.⁶¹ Had this change been made, it would have tilted the figurative representations towards the military (as, indeed, the design finally approved by the family does, albeit in a different way).

Despite Gehry's expressed willingness to consider modifications, the Eisenhower family were implacably opposed to the design. In October 2012, John Eisenhower wrote to Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), a World War II veteran who served as Vice Chairman of the EMC until his death later that year, saying that the scope and scale of the memorial were "too extravagant" and that it tried to do too much.⁶² Inouye's death reminded the EMC of the urgent need to complete the memorial while there were members of the "Greatest Generation" alive to see it.⁶³ Susan Eisenhower, however, asked Congress to defund the current design and to bring together a non-partisan group to reorganize the enterprise.⁶⁴

Congressional leaders, conservative journalists, and others picked up on the cues coming from Eisenhower family members and from a damning report Shubow had issued. The columnist George Will called the memorial "an exhibitionistic triumph of theory over function—more a monument to its creator, Frank Gehry, practitioner of architectural flamboyance, than to the most underrated president."⁶⁵ Others agreed that the design drew attention to the architect rather than to Eisenhower. The memorial "is not about Ike. It's about Gehry," the critic Catesby Leigh commented.⁶⁶ Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah) chimed in that it was not a monument to the president, but "a monument to a designer [Gehry] with a theme about President Eisenhower."⁶⁷

A persistent refrain in the criticisms was the contrast between the architect's supposed egocentrism and the president's exemplary modesty. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-California), who would become the memorial design's nemesis, said that its "immodesty is unbefitting of the humility and plain-spokenness that characterized our 34th President."⁶⁸ Military veterans echoed Issa: a navy veteran complained that "the grandiose scope and scale of the memorial do not befit President Eisenhower. He was a general who never bragged, did not wear his medals on his uniform, and requested to be buried in the same \$80 casket the Army provides for all of its soldiers."⁶⁹ A member of Eisenhower's military staff said that the scale of the design was "out of character for a man who believed so strongly in service and humility." Eisenhower, he said, would want a "simpler, more modest memorial."⁷⁰

The design's innovative quality had become a focal point for attack. Any memorial design that is notable for any reason—for its novelty, grandeur, or impact—brings attention both to the person being commemorated and to the designer. The design team was in a double bind: create a memorial that was innocuous and be accused of diminishing the subject; or produce the sort of path-breaking design that Gehry was presumably selected to create and be accused of abetting the architect's self-promotion. The memorial's detractors said that the tapestries would appear to be a "billboard," an unattractive way of seeing the metallic screens, about which members of the CFA had been critical; worse, the critics said they would be an advertisement not of the president but of the architect himself. Whether or not this "billboard" criticism was fair, it did touch on a problem with which the designers long struggled: how to achieve the right degree of translucency and legibility so that the images in the tapestries could be made out at various distances, and so that the screens would not block too much light from the Lyndon B. Johnson Building behind them.⁷¹

Members of Congress borrowed a line of attack first mounted by Shubow, the need for a verbal explanation of the symbolic meaning of the tapestries. How, he asked, was anyone supposed to know that the trees depicted in the mesh represented the landscape of the Midwest? It could be anywhere, Kansas or Kazakhstan.

"Monuments," Shubow said, "ought to be clear and unequivocal in their meaning . . . They must be legible without a guide or key, and certainly without a visitor center or iPad. Monuments speak to us even without signage."⁷² Legislators critical of the Gehry design extensively quoted Shubow's words. They said the memorial "should be self-explanatory so that ordinary Americans will understand the ideas being conveyed without the need of a visitor center or guide."⁷³

The congressional critics took up the complaint about the memorial's mounting costs to the government. Rep. Doc Hastings (R-Washington) was the chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, and Bishop was the chairman of its Subcommittee on Public Lands and Environmental Regulation. The Natural Resources Committee enjoyed broad jurisdiction over the activities of the National Park Service, the memorial's governmental sponsor. In a joint letter to the GSA, which was in charge of contracts for the project, Hastings and Bishop asked a series of detailed questions that demanded an accounting of expenditures and asked for copies of contracts and other documents.⁷⁴ The implication—or warning—was that they were searching for evidence of excessive costs and of impropriety in the awarding of contracts.

By 2014, private fundraising had achieved minimal results. In July of that year, citing objections to the design, the opposition of the family, and fundraising difficulties, Bishop introduced legislation that called for the memorial commission to be reconstituted and for a new design competition to be held. New commission members would be selected with the advice of the Eisenhower Foundation, whose board of directors included the four Eisenhower grandchildren.⁷⁵ Opponents of Bishop's bill pointed out that holding a new competition would cost \$17 million and hold up the project for years, with no guarantee that the new effort would be any more successful than the old one.⁷⁶ Bishop's bill was not enacted, but simultaneously with its introduction, the Natural Resources Committee released a staff report that complained, "The Eisenhower Memorial Commission was established in 1999, and 15 years later there is still no memorial, or approved design for a memorial. Yet the Commission has continued to return each year to Congress to ask for additional funds."⁷⁷ Together, Bishop's

bill and the committee report registered significant Republican Party opposition to the design.

Amid the rising congressional opposition, the memorial design had been proceeding through the review process in the CFA and the NCPC. Although the CFA had given the design conceptual approval in 2011, the membership of the CFA had changed markedly by 2013, so a recap of the history of the design was needed. New commission members had many reservations about the relationship between landscape and other elements, the content of the tapestries, the plantings, and the configuration of the trees. The CFA approved the design as a whole in July 2013, but the details of the memorial precinct were still subject to review, and hence open to requests for revision.⁷⁸

The review process became entangled with the legislators' objections at the NCPC, of which Rep. Issa was a commissioner. A zealous conservative, he had clear sympathies with the Eisenhower grandchildren. Issa suggested that the designers come back with a revised proposal without the columns and the tapestries.⁷⁹ All that would be left would be a park with statues and inscriptions. Had that proposition prevailed, Gehry Partners would have withdrawn from the project.⁸⁰ Issa said that he had preferred the tapestries when they depicted scenes from Eisenhower's career—D-Day, the Cold War, desegregation—and he found the trees nondescript.⁸¹ Like Susan Eisenhower and Bishop, Issa used fundraising problems as a form of leverage. "We are running into an incredibly tough time to bring forth [congressional] funds," he said. "The time for endless debate has to be over, [and] the Gehry organization and this Commission [the NCPC] really do have to find a way to find the middle ground."⁸² Issa's chairmanship of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the principal investigating committee of the House of Representatives, gave him authority to delve into the history of the memorial project, and he questioned whether the competition that had selected Gehry had been above board.⁸³ Issa speculated that if those in authority decided to scrap Gehry's design, they could "just build a park, put in some small statues, take [Gehry's] name off of it and call it a memorial. And it'd be less grand, but, in fact, it would be less blighted too."⁸⁴

In April 2014, with Issa's encouragement, the NCPC determined that the design did not meet all of their seven design principles and had to be revised.⁸⁵ The design team and EMC representatives complained in vain that the design did meet the principles and that the NCPC's interpretation of them was "subjective." Whatever the merits of the case, the NCPC had statutory authority to approve or reject a design and the designers were obliged to satisfy the objections. They removed the side tapestry panels, about which the CFA also had long-standing objections, and moved two of the columns further back from Independence Avenue, clearing the view to the Capitol Building.⁸⁶ In November, the design team submitted a full proposal, with these revisions, to the CFA. The statuary Gehry had agreed to add would be created by Sergey Eylanbekov and Penelope Jencks, and would stand in front of bas reliefs that acted as a background and stage set.⁸⁷ The CFA asked for further refinements in the design, including the transformation of the landscape to one that would be more symbolic than literalistic.⁸⁸

Once the designers introduced the changes, the memorial again came before the CFA and the NCPC, which granted their final approvals in June and July 2015.⁸⁹ Normally, that would bring the process of design development and revision to an end. However, the "final approvals" did not end the story. The statutory commissions might be satisfied but the Eisenhower family and the congressional critics were not. A few years earlier, the writer Jeffrey Frank had wittily remarked that the memorial design had managed to achieve something rare in Washington: "in true bipartisan spirit, almost everyone hates it."⁹⁰ On the eve of the commissions' final approvals, a *Washingtonian* magazine headline suggested that the remarkable consensus endured: "Everyone Still Hates the Planned Eisenhower Memorial."⁹¹ So long as the Eisenhower family remained resolutely opposed to the memorial, and while the design remained mired in controversy, the chances that it would gain enough private donations and government appropriations to be built were doubtful.

In April 2016, the press reported that private fundraising efforts had raised only \$5 million of the expected \$150 million the memorial would cost, if it were ever to be constructed. EMC commissioner Cole said, "Americans are simply not opening their wallets

to what is essentially a monument to architect Frank Gehry's ego instead of a memorial to Ike."⁹² Perhaps just as bad, the government had by then given \$66 million of taxpayer money to the memorial, with no certainty it would ever be completed.

Now, the powerful Appropriations Committee lowered the boom. Its chairman, Rep. Hal Rogers (R-KY), was one of those who in 2013 had objected to further federal funding for the memorial.⁹³ The committee complained about the memorial's "ongoing indifference" to the views of the family, finding it "unacceptable and inconceivable" that a memorial to Eisenhower could go forward without their active support. Taking note of the millions spent on salary costs, consultants, and architect's fees, the committee asked for an accounting of all expenditures and called for a "reset," which would involve a new memorial design competition, with family members involved in the selection of the design, and the appointment of new staff for the EMC. Until Congress authorized "an open, public, and transparent new design process," the committee said that it declined to provide any further capital costs for the construction of the memorial; it would meet only the salary and other costs required to keep the memorial commission alive.⁹⁴

These difficulties induced the EMC and the designers voluntarily to introduce changes in order to win over the opponents. The problem was that any such changes in turn superseded the approvals of the statutory review commissions: each time a new element was introduced, it had to win the support of the NCPC and the CFA all over again. In 2017, the CFA and the NCPC considered three such changes. In a radical transformation of the original concept, the tapestry scene shifted to a portrait of peacetime Normandy instead of the Kansas landscape. The statue of the young Eisenhower moved to an off-center location behind the tapestry, near the Lyndon B. Johnson Building, making it less prominent. Finally, four trees were to be removed. The members of the NCPC approved the revisions, but declared themselves to be "perplexed" and "puzzled" by the changes, and said that they had preferred the Midwestern landscape in the tapestry. Some critics of the previous version of the tapestries were just as unhappy: Shubow, now apparently regretting the changes that his criticisms had helped to prompt, complained that the resulting design was

"confused, illegible, and weak."⁹⁵ He asked the CFA to reinstate the previous design.⁹⁶

Members of the CFA reluctantly approved the shift in scene from Kansas to peacetime Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, but pointed out the obvious: the transformation of the landscape in the tapestries changed the meaning of the memorial considerably. The design had lost its narrative coherence.⁹⁷ The CFA had once described the statue of the young Eisenhower as the "conceptual fulcrum" for the memorial as a whole—linking the aspirations symbolized by the landscape image on the tapestry with the accomplishments of Eisenhower represented in the sculptural tableaux and inscriptions.⁹⁸ The removal of the Kansas landscape left the statue of the young Eisenhower bereft of the context in which its presence had once been meaningful. The inscribed wall on which the figure sits will feature an extended passage from the homecoming speech, providing an independent explanatory context for a statue that I suspect will be popular with visitors. There will, however, be no marriage between the depicted landscape of the tapestries and the plantings in the memorial precinct.

Craig Webb, of Gehry Partners, put the best face on things by explaining that the use of the Normandy landscape would "serve as the symbolic bridge between Eisenhower's military and civilian careers," but that statement is unpersuasive.⁹⁹ There is no obvious connection between Normandy and Eisenhower's career as president. Supposedly the Normandy coast represents the peacetime world that President Eisenhower strove to achieve, but any tranquil landscape could suggest that. The elephant in the room is that these modifications were being made to appease the opponents of the design, not for any aesthetic reason intelligible to the professional experts on the review commissions. The best, perhaps only, recommendation for the changes was that they had resulted from a compromise accepted by the Eisenhower family. Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, a member of the EMC's advisory committee, had brokered the agreement. Gehry was said not to have been involved in the discussions.¹⁰⁰ Congress appropriated a further \$45 million on top of the \$66 million already committed.¹⁰¹ With the compromise achieved, ground breaking took place at the beginning of November 2017.¹⁰²

Once intended to rewrite the language of monumental commemoration, the memorial instead re-inscribed tradition once realistic statuary and chiseled texts became its central components. By the time the further changes were made, it seemed that there was no longer any reason for anyone to be enthusiastic about the design. The proposal for a presidential memorial that would artistically evoke the Midwestern landscape from which the young Eisenhower sprang at least articulated a meaningful concept, even if some disliked the idea and others believed it would be illegible without an explanatory text. Gehry had emphasized the simplicity of the design in September 2011. "We just don't want it to be three memorials," he said. "We want it to be one essential thing and keep it compact."¹⁰³ When the statuary groups and large-scale inscriptions were added, the memorial lost its formal unity. It became a mish-mash of narrative, textual, landscape, architectural, and expressive elements, an instance of what one critic has described as "memorial sprawl": that is, the inability of recent memorial designers to distil people, events, or ideals into formally resonant, non-narrative forms.¹⁰⁴ With the final compromise, the design fell into incoherence.

Issa had spoken presciently at a review meeting of the NCPC when he said that introducing piecemeal changes to answer individual objections "might please everyone individually, [but] you please no one cumulatively."¹⁰⁵ Despite their awareness of such pitfalls, the design's critics seem not to have found a way to avoid them. In 2014 NCPC commissioner Mina Wright said that the memorial was succumbing to "design by committee."¹⁰⁶ Rep. Rush Holt (D-New Jersey) expanded on that charge. Certain that Congress should not interfere with the details of the design, he commented, "The only thing worse than art designed by a Committee is art designed by a Congressional committee."¹⁰⁷ In the end, it was worse even than that: design by a back-room deal.

Few visitors to the memorial, when it is completed, will know about the backstage wrangling from which its final design emerged. They will have still less chance of knowing about a particular decision to alter the design that attracted no attention when it was made and so escaped controversy. In June 2015, Webb said that a change had been introduced in the Oval Office statuary group, which showed Eisenhower flanked by a military adviser

and two civilian advisers. The three figures would no longer be portrait statues but would become generic figures. In response to the EMC's advice, one of them would be an African American.¹⁰⁸

This change follows the trend in recent commemorative statuary, where there has been a felt imperative to produce groups of figures whose ethnic composition "looks like America."¹⁰⁹ The insertion of an African American figure into this statuary group touched on a delicate subject, though. As president, Eisenhower had a decidedly mixed record on Civil Rights; it has been described as "hesitant, cautious, and perhaps even timorous."¹¹⁰ He signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and ordered army troops to ensure the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, that same year. However, before the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision outlawing "separate but equal" educational provision, Eisenhower had expressed sympathy with white Southerners who did not want black students to sit alongside their children.¹¹¹ He had been unenthusiastic about the *Brown* decision and doubted whether legally enforced desegregation would succeed in changing racial attitudes.¹¹² While there are many photographs of Eisenhower meeting African Americans in the White House, they are usually part of large groups; there was no African American White House aide who would plausibly fit the role of one of Eisenhower's three principal advisers.¹¹³ The scene with generic figures was invented in order to make a point about racial equality that met the political requirements of present times but did not entirely match the historical realities of the Eisenhower White House, except, possibly, in its tokenism.

Webb explains that an African American figure had to be inserted in the White House scene because it was impossible to place any African Americans in the other statuary group, which shows Eisenhower addressing members of the 101st Airborne Division on D-Day. No African Americans served in that unit's combat arms during World War II. Because of that factual position, and because the D-Day scene is based on a historical photograph, it was not considered feasible to change the scene by conjuring any African American soldiers into the group.¹¹⁴ In contrast, the grouping of figures in the Oval Office scene is imaginary, not based on a photograph, so it was considered acceptable to include an African American figure.¹¹⁵

There was another reason that it would have been awkward to include any African American figures in the scene with the 101st Airborne. By the time Eisenhower ordered members of that unit to aid in the desegregation of Central High School, in 1957, the 101st was a racially integrated division. The Eisenhower administration, though, ordered its African American members to be pulled out of the line when the troops took part in the school's desegregation, so as not to offend racist white Southerners.¹¹⁶ The unit's combat arm was lily white on June 6, 1945 and the troops mustered to confront a racist mob remained so in Little Rock on September 24, 1957. Without delving into the details of the administration's actions, when Issa's proposals for an alternative design came before it, the EMC resolved that Eisenhower's "pragmatic" leadership during the crisis in Little Rock would be a model for its own decision-making.¹¹⁷

Visitors to the memorial will have no perception of the hands that always hover above the realized designs of commemorative monuments in Washington, DC, visible only in their effects. The memorial is designed to remember the general, the president, and the person, but it will also recall the work of serial manipulations: the hand that painted a figure white and placed it at the center of an architectural model; the others that, failing to remove that figure altogether, shoved it to a less prominent position; the salute to the South that ensured that no black faces were present in a military unit bent on supporting racial equality; and the later move that, with equal tact, ensured that a black man would be visible to posterity in Eisenhower's Oval Office. The Eisenhower Memorial will help cement the reputation of the figure it honors, but like all memorials in Washington, and perhaps more than most, its carved stone and crafted metal will at once conceal and preserve a story of political pressure, enforced compromise, and tactful euphemism, a story no less redolent of our times than of Eisenhower's own.

Notes

1. For Gehry's career, see Paul Goldberger, *Building Art: The Life and Work of Frank Gehry* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017). The author acknowledges with gratitude the Patricia and Phillip Frost

- Senior Fellowship at the Smithsonian American Art Museum, which supported the research on which this chapter is based.
2. Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, quoted in Thomas Hawk Creighton, *The Architecture of Monuments: The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Competition* (New York: Reinhold, 1962), 7. See also the discussion in Kirk Savage, *Monument Wars: Washington, DC, the National Mall, and the Transformation of the Memorial Landscape* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 18; Bernd Nicolai, "New Monumentalism in Contemporary Architecture," *Anglia* 131, no. 2-3 (2013): 299; Sigfried Giedion, "The Need for a New Monumentality," in Paul Zucker (ed.), *New Architecture and City Planning* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), 549-68.
3. Louis Sullivan, "Ornament in Architecture," *The Engineering Magazine*, 1892.
4. Patrick Hagopian, *The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 118-20, 304.
5. Public Law 106-79, 106th Congress (October 25, 1999).
6. Jennifer Reut, "Ike Memorial Mired in Controversy," *Perspectives on History* (November 2013): 11.
7. Public Law 107-117, 107th Congress (January 10, 2002) amended Public Law 106-79 by providing authority to establish a memorial in compliance with the Commemorative Works Act (CWA), and by authorizing the funds. The National Capital Memorial Commission voted unanimously to recommend a location within Area I at its March 2002 meeting. Transcript of the National Capital Memorial Commission, March 1, 2002. My thanks to Glenn DeMarr for providing me with a copy of the transcript.
8. Carol Ross Joynt, "Tug of War: How a Small Army of VIPs Killed the Eisenhower Memorial," *Washingtonian* (May 2014): 64. The relevant approvals of the location came from the (renamed) National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission on November 8, 2005, the National Capital Planning Commission on September 7, 2006, and the Commission of Fine Arts on September 20, 2006. Congress authorized construction in Area I, into which part of the site falls, by passing Public Law 109-220, 109th Congress (May 5, 2006).
9. Rep. Darrell Issa, Minutes of the National Capital Planning Commission meeting September 4, 2014, 99.
10. National Capital Planning Commission File No. 6694, Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial, *Approval of Site and Design Principles*,

- Staff Recommendation*, August 31, 2006. The Design Principles were: 1. Preserve reciprocal views to and from the US Capitol along Maryland Avenue, SW. 2. Enhance the nature of the site as one in a sequence of public spaces embellishing the Maryland Avenue vista. 3. Create a unified memorial site that integrates the disparate parcels into a meaningful and functional public gathering place that also unifies the surrounding precinct. 4. Reflect L'Enfant Plan principles by shaping the Memorial site as a separate and distinct public space that complements the Department of Education Headquarters and other surrounding buildings. 5. Respect and complement the architecture of the surrounding precinct. 6. Respect the building lines of the surrounding rights-of-way and the alignment of trees along Maryland Avenue. 7. Incorporate significant green space into the design of the memorial.
11. NCPC, *Approval of Site and Design Principles, Staff Recommendation*, 15. Part of the site fell into Area II, where the construction of new memorials was encouraged. The relevant planning documents were the National Capital Planning Commission's 1997 *Legacy Plan*, and the 2001 *Museums and Monuments Master Plan*. The *National Capital Framework Plan* of 2006 reaffirmed the principle of moving significant memorials away from the central Mall area.
 12. US Gen. Services Administration, EMC-WPC-08-5019, *National Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial*, August 15, 2008, 1, <<https://www.fbo.gov>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
 13. The board included representatives from the EMC, General Services Administration, the Eisenhower family, and private sector design peers. "A Five-Star Folly: An Investigation into the Cost Increases, Construction Delays, and Design Problems That Have Been a Disservice to the Effort to Memorialize Dwight D. Eisenhower," Majority Staff Report, US Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, 113th Congress (July 25, 2014), 14.
 14. The jury consisted of three architects, two landscape architects, one urban designer, one information designer, one lighting designer, and David Eisenhower. "Five-Star Folly," 18.
 15. For an account of the multiple steps in the selection process, see "Five-Star Folly," 14–18, and Carl Reddel's responses to a series of written questions by Rep. Rob Bishop, US House, 112th Congress, 2nd sess., Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands, Oversight Hearing, March 20, 2012 (hereafter, March 2012 Hearing), 43–47.

16. Cole, "Monumental Shame." Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), a commissioner from the inception of the EMC, replaced Siciliano as chairman of the commission in 2015. Siciliano was a fundraiser for the Gehry-designed Walt Disney Concert Hall in Los Angeles. Siciliano and Gehry are honorary life directors of the Los Angeles Philharmonic.
17. March 2012 Hearing, 30–31, 43, 49.
18. See Testimony of Sam Roche, Minutes of the NCPC meeting (October 2, 2014), 73.
19. "Five-Star Folly," 14.
20. Minutes of the CFA meeting May 20, 2010, 5. For the reasons that some of these proposed photographs were rejected, see Philip Kennicott, "The Monument War," *Washington Post Magazine*, May 13, 2012.
21. The speeches on which the EMC eventually settled were Eisenhower's London Guildhall Address of June 12, 1945; his First Inaugural Address; and his Farewell Speech of January 17, 1961. Minutes of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting April 29, 2015.
22. Minutes of the CFA meeting May 20, 2010, 4.
23. Thomas E. Luebke to Margaret O'Dell, Regional Director, NPS National Capital Region, May 28, 2010. In the records of the Commission of Fine Arts.
24. Testimony of Carl Reddel, March 2012 Hearing, 41.
25. Minutes of the CFA meeting January 20, 2011, 3.
26. Gehry Partners/AECOM, *Eisenhower Memorial: Concept Submission to United States Commission of Fine Arts*, January 6, 2011, 74. In the records of the Commission of Fine Arts.
27. Transcript of the discussions at the January 2011 meeting of the CFA, unpaginated [15], in the records of the Commission of Fine Arts. I appreciate the assistance of Kathryn Fanning of the Commission of Fine Arts in obtaining copies of several meeting transcripts.
28. Gehry Partners/AECOM, *Eisenhower Memorial*, January 6, 2011, 72–73.
29. "The Eisenhower Life Series," Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home, <<https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
30. Testimony of Carl Reddel, March 2012 Hearing, 35; Gehry Partners/AECOM, *Eisenhower Memorial*, January 6, 2011, 73.
31. CFA Meeting Transcript, January 2011, 13.
32. Minutes of the CFA meeting January 20, 2011, 4.
33. Gehry Partners/AECOM, *Eisenhower Memorial*, January 6, 2011, 73.

34. Ibid. 28–29.
35. Minutes of the CFA meeting May 20, 2010, 3.
36. CFA Meeting Transcript, September 15, 2011, 22.
37. Kennicott, “Monument War,” 14.
38. Philip Kennicott, “Review: Frank Gehry’s Eisenhower Memorial Reinvigorates the Genre,” *Washington Post*, December 15, 2011.
39. David M. Childs to Reps. Rob Bishop and Raul Grijalva, March 2012 Hearing, 6.
40. Remarks of Thomas E. Luebke, CFA Meeting Transcript, September 15, 2011, 9.
41. March 2012 Hearing, 39, 48.
42. Kennicott, “Monument War,” 15–16.
43. Philip Kennicott, “Eisenhower Family Calls for Timeout in Approval of Memorial,” *Washington Post*, October 6, 2011.
44. Joynt, “Tug of War,” 65.
45. Testimony of Susan Eisenhower, March 2012 Hearing, 16; Testimony of Carl Reddel, March 2012 Hearing, 42. David and Anne Eisenhower had spoken favorably about the design before the addition of the young Eisenhower statue. Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting March 25, 2010, 6–7.
46. Susan Eisenhower, “Let’s Engage on the Real Issues with Ike’s Memorial,” February 3, 2012, <<https://susaneisenhower.wordpress.com/2012/02/03/dont-swift-boat-critics-of-the-eisenhower-memorial-design/>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
47. Testimony of Carl Reddel, March 2012 Hearing, 42.
48. John S.D. Eisenhower to Anne Eisenhower and Susan Eisenhower, December 11, 2011, <https://susaneisenhower.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/jsde_letter_re_memorial2.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2018).
49. H-Rept 113–705, 3. Judy Scott Feldmann of the National Coalition to Save Our Mall repeated the call for a simple statue on a pedestal. Minutes of the NCPC meeting October 2, 2014, 95.
50. Susan Eisenhower, “The Eisenhower Memorial: Another Front in the Culture Wars?,” January 24, 2012, <<https://susaneisenhower.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/the-eisenhower-memorial-another-front-in-the-culture-wars/>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
51. March 2012 Hearing, 10–17.
52. Testimony of Carl Reddel, March 2012 Hearing, 41.
53. Eisenhower, “The Eisenhower Memorial: Another Front in the Culture Wars?”
54. Jan C. Scruggs and Joel L. Swerdlow, *To Heal a Nation: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 73.

55. Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting September 17, 2014, 9. Cole was appointed as a commissioner of the EMC in August 2013.
56. Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting July 12, 2011, 7.
57. Testimony of Carl Reddel, US House, 113th Congress, 1st sess., Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Public Lands and Environmental Regulation, Hearing on HR 1126, Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Completion Act (hereafter, March 2013 Hearing), 46; Gehry to Rep. Rob Bishop, March 19, 2012, March 2012 Hearing, 4–5.
58. March 2013 Hearing, 17.
59. Savage, *Monument Wars*, 197.
60. We see this in the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial, where the armillary sphere was replaced by a statue; in the original design for the FDR memorial by Pedersen and Tilney, where a statue was plonked amidst the concrete stele before the whole ensemble was rejected; in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, where right-wing veterans were appeased by the addition of a statue of infantrymen, leading to the later addition of a women’s memorial statue; in the Korean War Veterans Memorial, where the original design called for rough-hewn granite statues forming a symbolic timeline, which were transformed into a realistic cast metal depiction of a platoon in action; and in the Martin Luther King Jr. National Memorial, where the designers added a massive statue in response to a prompt by the memorial commission.
61. Frank Gehry to Commissioners, May 15, 2012, Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting of May 15, 2012, 3.
62. John S.D. Eisenhower to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, October 18, 2012, in March 2013 Hearing, 10.
63. Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting June 19, 2013, 4.
64. March 2013 Hearing, 8.
65. Kennicott, “Monument War,” 16.
66. Catesby Leigh, “A Monumental Folly,” *National Review*, June 13, 2017.
67. Testimony of Rep. Rob Bishop, March 2013 Hearing, 2.
68. Issa to Preston Bryant Jr., chairman of the NCPC, April 3, 2014, <<https://oversight.house.gov>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
69. J. William Middendorf II, to L. Preston Bryant Jr., March 23, 2014. In the records of the National Capital Planning Commission. Middendorf served as secretary of the navy from 1974 to 1977.

70. Colonel Ralph Hauenstein, quoted in Rep. Bill Huizinga to L. Preston Bryant Jr., April 3, 2014. In the records of the National Capital Planning Commission. Hauenstein was the former chief of intelligence on General Eisenhower's staff during World War II. See also Blake Seitz, "58 Generals, Admirals Sign Letter Opposing Design of Eisenhower Memorial," *Washington Free Beacon*, September 13, 2016.
71. Leigh, "Monumental Folly."
72. Statement by Justin Shubow, March 2013 Hearing, 35.
73. H-Rpt. 113-705, 4.
74. Reps. Doc Hastings and Rob Bishop to Dan M. Tangherlini, US General Services Administration, May 15, 2013, <https://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/05_-15-13_hastingsltractadmintangherlini.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2018).
75. HR 5203, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission Reform Act, July 25, 2014, <<http://www.eisenhower-foundation.net/160/Foundation>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
76. "Dissenting Views," H-Rpt. 113-705, 11. The \$17 million sum came from a report by the Congressional Budget Office. Associated Press, "Key Arts Panel Approves Gehry's Eisenhower Memorial Design with Suggested Changes for DC Site," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2013.
77. All Actions H.R.5203, 113th Congress, 2013–2014, <<https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5203/all-actions?overview=closed#tabs>> (accessed June 13, 2018); "Five-Star Folly," 10.
78. Minutes of the CFA meeting of July 18, 2013; minutes of the CFA meeting November 21, 2013. Six CFA members had been replaced in the period 2011–13 once their terms expired, and between 2010, when the CFA had responded positively to an informational presentation by the design team, and 2013, the only consistent members of the commission were Chairman Earl A. Powell and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk.
79. Darrell Issa to Rocco C. Siciliano, <http://freebeacon.com/blog/breaking-issa-requests-ike-memorial-commission-to-submit-new-design/>, November 14, 2014. Issa was an ex officio member of the NCPC as chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
80. Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting of September 17, 2014, 6.
81. Minutes of the NCPC meeting April 3, 2014, 78.

82. Ibid. 75–76.
83. Darrell Issa to Rocco C. Siciliano, February 29, 2012, <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.net/docs/Darrell_Issa_letter_to_Eisenhower_Memorial_Commission.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2018).
84. Minutes of the NCPC meeting September 4, 2014, 123.
85. Minutes of the NCPC meeting April 3, 2014, 51–52. The principal problems were the relationship with nearby buildings, intrusion into their building line, and the reciprocal views to and from the Capitol Building. In the discussion, the commissioners referred to the size and scale of the tapestries as the underlying problem, and also cited the absence of any place for public gatherings.
86. Minutes of the NCPC meeting September 4, 2014, 67, 70.
87. Gehry Partners/AECOM, *Eisenhower Memorial: Commemorative Arts and Landscape Design*, presented to the Commission of Fine Arts, November 20, 2014.
88. Minutes of the CFA meeting November 20, 2014, letter from Thomas E. Luebke, Secretary, Commission of Fine Arts, to Lisa Mendelson-Ielmini, Acting Regional Director, National Park Service, National Capital Region, December 1, 2014. In the records of the Commission of Fine Arts.
89. Minutes of the CFA meeting June 18, 2015, letter from Thomas E. Luebke, Secretary, Commission of Fine Arts, to Robert Fogel, Regional Director, National Park Service, National Capital Region, June 26, 2015. In the records of the Commission of Fine Arts. The National Capital Planning Commission gave final approval for the design at its July 9, 2015 meeting. NCPC, *Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial: Executive Director's Recommendation*, February 2, 2017, 7.
90. Jeffrey Frank, "Rescuing the Eisenhower Memorial," *The New Yorker*, March 25, 2013.
91. Benjamin Freed, "Everyone Still Hates the Planned Eisenhower Memorial," *Washingtonian*, June 16, 2015.
92. Joe Crowe, "Eisenhower Memorial Raises Just \$5 Million of \$150 Million Needed," *Newsmax.com*, April 4, 2016, <<https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/eisenhower-memorial-fund/2016/04/27/id/725996/>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
93. Sam Roche, "Rogers Aided in Eisenhower Memorial's Fresh Start," *Lexington Herald Leader*, November 8, 2013.
94. US Congress, House, 114th Cong., 1st sess., Committee on Appropriations, Report on Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2016, H-Rpt. 114–170, June 18, 2015, 87–89.

95. Michelle Goldchain, "NCPC 'Puzzled' by Eisenhower Memorial Design Changes, Approves Project Anyway," <<https://dc.curbed.com/2017/2/2/14487700/memorial-eisenhower-ncpc>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
96. Minutes of the CFA meeting January 23, 2017.
97. Minutes of the CFA meeting May 18, 2017; minutes of the CFA meeting September 20, 2017.
98. Minutes of the CFA meeting May 21, 2015, letter from Thomas Luebke to Robert Vogel, May 29, 2015.
99. Minutes of the CFA meeting January 23, 2017. Gehry had decided around 2012 that his presence in Washington was not helping. Goldberger, *Building Art*, 419. From that point on Gehry Partners was represented in meetings of the EMC by Meaghan Lloyd and John Bowers. From early 2014 onward, Webb was the firm's principal presenter at meetings of the CFA.
100. Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission, press release, "Senator Pat Roberts Announces Support from the Eisenhower Family for the Eisenhower Memorial Project to Move Forward," September 19, 2016, <<http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/sites/default/files/public/press/Eisenhower%20Family%20Announcement%20Package%209.19.16%20PDF.pdf>> (accessed June 13, 2018); Kriston Capps, "Is the Eisenhower Memorial Moving Forward without Frank Gehry?" *CityLab*, September 20, 2016, <<https://www.citylab.com/design/2016/09/is-the-eisenhower-memorial-moving-forward-without-frank-gehry/500645/>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
101. Rebecca Cooper, "Eisenhower Memorial Gets Go-ahead Funding to Start Construction," *Washington Business Journal*, May 1, 2017.
102. Patrick Lynch, "Construction Begins on Frank Gehry's Eisenhower Memorial in Washington DC," *Arch Daily*, November 2, 2017.
103. CFA Meeting Transcript, September 15, 2011, 18.
104. Remarks of Catesby Leigh, minutes of the CFA meeting May 21, 2017.
105. Minutes of the NCPC meeting September 4, 2014, 110.
106. Ibid. 138, 149–59.
107. Rep. Rush Holt, March 2013 Hearing, 46.
108. Minutes of the CFA meeting June 18, 2015.
109. For a discussion of this trend, see Hagopian, *Vietnam War in American Memory*, 268–72; and Patrick Hagopian, "The Korean War Veterans Memorial and Problems of Representation," *Public Art Dialogue* 2, no. 2 (2012): 232–33.

110. Michael J. Klarman, "Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement," *Virginia Law Review* 80, no. 1 (February 1994): 130.
111. Mark Stern, "Presidential Strategies and Civil Rights: Eisenhower, the Early Years, 1952–54," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 788.
112. Michael S. Mayer, "With Much Deliberation and Some Speed: Eisenhower and the Brown Decision," *Journal of Southern History* 52, no. 1 (February 1986): 49.
113. Eisenhower's most prominent African American adviser was E. Frederic Morrow, but he did not occupy the top tier of presidential advisers and his memoir, *Black Man in the White House*, made for uncomfortable reading for anyone invested in the idea of racial egalitarianism in the Eisenhower administration. Wolfgang Saxon, "E. Frederic Morrow, 88, Aide in Eisenhower Administration," *New York Times*, July 21, 1994.
114. "General Dwight D. Eisenhower Gives the Order of the Day, June 6, 1944," by an unknown Army photographer. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. LC-USZ62-25600.
115. Personal communication between the author and Craig Webb at the National Building Museum, June 18, 2015. The Oval Office scene was originally based on "The Elder Statesman," a 1966 photograph by Yousuf Karsh showing Eisenhower with his hand on a globe, but that shows the president alone. In the process of design development, the globe changed to a map in the bas relief that served as a backdrop to the free-standing statuary showing the president with the three advisers.
116. Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* (New York: Random House, 2012), 723; Adam Serwer, "Why Don't We Remember Ike as a Civil Rights Hero?" *MSNBC*, May 18, 2014, <<http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-dont-we-ike-civil-rights>> (accessed June 13, 2018).
117. Minutes of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission meeting September 17, 2014, 3, 10.

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